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Introduction1 
Across the world, the number of people forcibly displaced from their homes because of political per-
secution, conflict or serious human rights violations has doubled in the last decade. As of 2019, 
around 33.8 million people have been forced to leave their country and to seek refuge abroad (UNHCR 
2020).  
In principle, international law requires states to give those fleeing persecution and serious human 
rights violations access to their territory. The Human Rights Declaration grants the right to seek asy-
lum from persecution (Article 14). The “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees” drafted in 1951 
in Geneva further obligates states not to penalize and not to return refugees to where they might face 
threats to their life or freedom (principle of “non-refoulement”) (Article 33(1)). Additionally, states are 
not allowed to discriminate between refugee populations based on race, religion, or country of origin 
(Article 3).  
The Refugee Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol have been signed by 149 states of the world and 
its fundamental principles – such as the principle of non-refoulement – have become part of interna-
tional customary law, which means that they also bind the few remaining states that are not party to 
the Convention (Drewski, Gerhards 2020). In consequence, one could expect states across the world to 
adopt similar policies towards the admission of refugees and to provide similar justifications for these 
policies.  
                                                          
1 This paper presents first and preliminary results from the project “Debating the Legitimacy of Borders” conducted at the 
Cluster of Excellence “Contestations of the Liberal Script” (EXC 2055, Project-ID: 390715649), which is funded by the 
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany's Excellence Strategy – EXC 
2055. It is a transcription of the presentation given in the Ad-hoc Group “Public Discourses on the Admission of Refugees 
and Asylum Seekers: Similarities and Differences between Countries” and therefore contains few references to the liter-
ature. 
DANI EL  DREWS K I  AND  JÜR GEN GERHARDS  
2 
However, in practice, states’ policies on the admission of forced migrants and their justifications of 
them differ significantly (see Abdelaaty 2021). For example, Turkey has adopted an “open door policy” 
for refugees fleeing the regime of Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian civil war and is now home to the 
highest number of refugees worldwide. Turkey’s president Erdogan mobilizes a discourse of religious 
solidarity to justify this policy. Chile grants a special “visa of democratic responsibility” to Venezuelan 
migrants who escape the political instability under the Socialist regime of Nicolás Maduro – though 
strictly speaking not a refugee crisis, but according to the UNHCR one of the worst crises of displace-
ment across the world. In contrast, Singapore, facing the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar as part of the 
ASEAN community, has completely sealed its borders, offering only humanitarian assistance. It justi-
fies this policy citing limited land and resources. 
This is the “puzzle” which motivates our research project. We seek to describe how and to under-
stand why political discourses on the admission of refugees differ between countries. We pursue es-
sentially two research questions, a descriptive and an explanatory one: First, we attempt to recon-
struct the arguments, narratives, and frames mobilized in political discourses to justify the admission 
or exclusion of forced migrants. Secondly – even though this is a qualitative research project – we try 
to explain differences between countries. 
By “political discourse” we understand the aggregate public communication of political actors such 
as state officials, party representatives or social movement leaders in different arenas of the public 
sphere, for example in parliament, the media or at rallies. Political discourses offer interpretations of 
issues of general concern by framing that issue in a specific way and by providing justifications for 
specific policies. Different political actors compete over the interpretation of these issues by making 
use of different framing strategies. Political actors’ success in shaping the public discourse becomes 
manifest when certain frames prevail and achieve hegemonic status, and when justifications are taken 
for granted (Ferree et al. 2002). Political discourses shape policies by influencing public opinion on 
them. 
To answer our research questions, we are conducting a qualitative analysis of political discourses in 
six countries: Chile, Germany, Poland, Singapore, Turkey, and Kenya.2 All these countries face pres-
sures to admit refugees, but some of them react with more restrictive and some with more permissive 
policies. With this selection of countries, we cover different displacement situations and explicitly in-
clude countries from different regions across the world, given that many studies on refugee-related 
discourses tend to focus on Western Europe and North America. Methodologically, we conduct quali-
tative content analyses of political statements made in parliamentary debates or in official speeches. 
We focus on the statements made by the main political parties in a country. At a later stage of the 
project, these content analyses will be complemented with interviews with key actors in the public 
sphere to understand their discursive strategies. 
The following sections provide an overview of our conceptual framework, specify our strategy for 
sampling and data analysis, and report preliminary results of our analysis of political discourses in two 
countries: Turkey and Chile. 
Accounting for political discourses on refugees 
While the main aim of our study is to empirically show how the admission or rejection of refugees is 
discursively justified in different countries, we would also like to explain differences between and with-
                                                          
2 It is not yet decided whether we will include Kenya or Uganda. 
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in countries. By “explanation”, we do not mean that we want to establish causal relationships between 
variables that hold independently of the single case. Instead, we follow Max Weber's notion of “ver-
stehendes Erklären” (interpretative explanation) by providing a plausible interpretation for why the 
discourse in one country plays out as it does and why the framings differ from one country to another. 
We try to move beyond the following two dominant accounts in the literature by highlighting the im-
portance of context specific factors in the host country.  
One group of scholars stresses the normative force of international law and human rights norms in 
shaping national migration policies and discourses (e.g., Soysal 1994; Joppke 2005). Since World War II 
and in reaction to the displacements caused by totalitarian regimes, a body of international human 
rights and migration law has emerged that increasingly constrains national sovereignty over border 
control, for example through the principle of non-discrimination or the right to family reunification. It 
also singles out a particular group of migrants, namely refugees, who are granted the right to access 
the territory of another state in search of protection from political persecution and serious human 
rights violations and obligates states not to return refugees to where their lives are at risk. These 
norms and laws are embedded in a liberal discourse that stresses the sanctity of individual rights and 
the equality of all humans (regardless of race, nationality, ethnicity, religion, etc.) vis-à-vis primordial 
conceptions of community and the sovereign rights of the state.  
Another group of scholars stresses quite the opposite (e.g., Huysmans 2006; Hammerstadt 2014). 
They claim that confronted with increasing migration flows – and forced migration in particular – 
states will assert their sovereignty and close their borders. In particular, politicians will discursively 
construe migration policy as a matter of national security that requires government action to protect 
the nation. They will associate migrants not only with a threat to national security because they poten-
tially engage in criminal activities and terrorist acts. They will also portray them as a burden to the 
national welfare system, as competitors on the national labor market and as cultural others that un-
dermine social cohesion. When it comes to refugees, governments may continue to pay lip service to 
the norms of international protection, but they will try to avoid actually honoring their obligations by 
an array of policies that prevent refugees from reaching their territory and by discursively disqualify-
ing refugees as persons in need of protection (e.g., by labeling them “economic migrants”). 
We argue that none of these accounts are sufficient to help us make sense of the political dis-
courses on the admission of refugees we encountered in our data. Our main claim is that national 
contexts matter, as they shape the policies and political discourses on the admission of refugees and 
asylum seekers in significant ways. In fact, politicians in each country draw on very specific cultural 
repertoires, narratives, ideologies, and self-understandings to justify their policies towards refugees. 
Their framing strategies are shaped by what we call “discursive opportunity structures”. By discursive 
opportunity structures, we understand the contextual factors and ideational elements that make 
some political discourses resonate more than others within the public sphere of a country (McCam-
mon 2013). 
Following the idea of grounded theory, namely that explanations should be derived inductively 
from the empirical analysis, we have so far identified three relevant dimensions of a country’s discur-
sive opportunity structure that might help explain the character of its discourse on refugees. First, 
political discourses about refugees are typically embedded in definitions of a country’s collective identity 
and collective memories of its past. This refers to a definition of who “we” as a collective are by virtue of 
our history. Second, the discourse can also be related to interpretations of a country’s economic situation 
and security. Different assessments of a country’s economic strength and security situation have an 
effect on the political discourse towards refugees. And third, political discourses on refugees are relat-
ed to assessments of a country’s international relations and its foreign policy doctrine. This refers to how 
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a country positions itself in relation to other countries (particularly the refugee-sending country) and 
the international community at large. 
Up to this point, we have discussed the factors that might help to account for differences between 
countries in their discourses on refugees. But of course, there is typically not one homogenous politi-
cal discourse per country (at least in minimally democratic ones). Different political actors try to pro-
mote different interpretations of an issue and offer different policy solutions. To grasp these internal 
variations, we further draw on the concept of “cleavage structure” (Lipset, Rokkan 1967). Cleavage 
structures are deeply rooted and permanent lines of conflict in a society. Societies can be shaped by 
different kinds of cleavage structures. For example, there can be a religious/secular cleavage, an 
urban/rural cleavage, a center/periphery and/or a capital/labor cleavage. 
More recent studies claim that the dismantling of national borders following processes of globaliza-
tion and the increasing mobility of goods and people tend to provoke the emergence of a new cleav-
age between “cosmopolitans” and “communitarians”: Cosmopolitans advocate open borders and are 
in favor of migration, while communitarians defend border closure and tend to reject migration (de 
Wilde et al. 2019). However, we find that this account does not help to explain the different opinions 
regarding the admission of refugees in some countries in our sample. Instead, they map onto other 
kinds of cleavages, such as the religious/secular cleavage as in the case of Turkey, or a post-
authoritarian/democratic cleavage as in the case of Chile. In short, we claim that within-country differ-
ences of how to deal with the admission of refugees will be shaped by a society’s specific cleavage 
structure.  
Due to space limits, in this paper we will only focus on the dominant discourse in a country (i.e., the 
government’s discourse) and leave out within-country differences along its cleavage structure. In addi-
tion, we will report results from two countries (Turkey and Chile) only. 
Data and methods 
In our research project, we analyze political discourses in six countries around the world: Chile, Ger-
many, Poland, Singapore, Turkey, and Kenya. Why did we select these countries? Public debates on a 
topic arise only when an issue is perceived as a significant problem requiring government action. Thus, 
all countries in our analysis share that they face significant pressure to admit refugees and asylum 
seekers for various reasons. For example, they directly neighbor the refugees’ countries of origin (such 
as Turkey and Kenya), they are relatively prosperous and stable countries that attract refugees among 
other kinds of migrants (such as Chile and Germany), or they are part of regional organizations that 
are confronted with a refugee crisis (such as Poland as a member of the EU and Singapore as a mem-
ber of ASEAN). Given that we focus on political discourses, our choice of countries also includes only 
those that are not full-fledged authoritarian states and do not fully suppress public debate and par-
liamentary activity. 
At the same time, our choice of countries is also motivated by the aim to maximize variance across 
the following two dimensions: First, country differences can only be described and explained if there is 
variance in the “dependent variable” and countries differ in their framing. Therefore, we included cas-
es with a more refugee-friendly discourse and countries with more restrictive discourses and policies. 
Second, we have also maximized the geographic scope of our comparison. While much of the previous 
literature has focused on discourses in Western Europe and North America, we include countries of 
the so-called “Global South” in our analysis. In fact, most refugees worldwide are hosted there and not 
in the so-called “Global North”. 
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In each country, we focus on “critical discourse moments”. Critical discourse moments are mo-
ments when an issue becomes an important topic of public debate. For example, the Syrian civil war 
triggered a public debate on refugees in many countries. Critical discourse moments are processed in 
different “public forums” (Ferree et al. 2002). A “forum” is a more or less institutionalized ensemble of 
speakers and their audiences. There are forums like the mass media forum, the parliamentary forum 
(i.e., debates in parliament), the civil society forum, etc. We primarily but not exclusively focus on par-
liamentary debates. Finally, forums consist of different actors (speakers/authors and public). We focus 
on the statements of those speakers that are influential and speak on behalf of an important constitu-
ency. This means that we select statements made by the government and large political parties. 
For our discourse analysis, we make use of a scheme of analysis that was in part developed induc-
tively, and in part inspired by critical discourse analysis (Wodak, Meyer 2001). In the context of this 
paper, we will only refer to the most important dimensions of analysis: First, the statements we ana-
lyze typically pick up an issue related to migration and frame it as a problem. We call this the “problem 
diagnosis”. For example, one can frame the fact that many Syrian refugees enter a country as “there 
are too many illegal immigrants in our country”. Second, this problem diagnosis is typically put in rela-
tion to a certain definition of the “we”. This refers to how a society and its members are described and 
who belongs to it. For example, a self-definition can be “we as a Christian community”. Third, state-
ments typically describe the refugees in a certain way. They are put in different categories and charac-
terized accordingly. For example, they can be labeled as “Muslim terrorists”. Finally, these dimensions 
converge into a core argument justifying the admission or exclusion of migrants. For example, “we can 
legitimately exclude refugees because we have the right to defend our national sovereignty”. It must 
be noted that our analytical scheme also incorporates other dimensions which we cannot explain in 
detail here. 
As we have been working mostly on the cases of Chile and Turkey so far, we will focus on the re-
sults from these two countries only. We will also just focus on the respective governments’ discourses 
and leave out differences within countries. The governments of both countries have tended to adopt a 
rather permissive discourse towards refugees, but for different reasons, as we will see next. 
The political discourse on Syrian refugees in Turkey 
Background information on Turkey’s refugee policy 
Turkey hosts the largest number of refugees fleeing the Syrian civil war worldwide. As of 2019, Turkey 
has hosted 3.6 million Syrian refugees (relative to population size, Turkey only follows Jordan and Leb-
anon) (UNHCR 2020). Syrian refugees started arriving in Turkey in 2011 with the outbreak of the civil 
war. Turkey hosts a further 330,000 refugees and asylum seekers that come from Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Iran, and other countries, but they will not be the topic of our analysis. 
Turkey is party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol but keeps in place its geo-
graphic restriction to refugees originating from Europe. Nevertheless, the Turkish government initially 
pursued an “open border policy” towards Syrian refugees, expecting that the conflict would soon end. 
This policy was formalized following the 2013 “Law on Foreigners and International Protection,” based 
on which Syrian refugees are granted the status of “temporary protection.” It gives Syrians access to 
basic services but is more limited in scope than the refugee status under international law. Starting in 
2016, the Turkish government somewhat reversed course on its open border policy, by beginning with 
the construction of a border fence along the border with Syria in 2016 and legitimating its military 
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incursions in Northern Syria starting in 2018/19 with the need to create “safe zones” that would allow 
the repatriation of Syrian refugees.  
The Turkish government’s discourse on Syrian refugees 
The continuously rising number of Syrian refugees in Turkey has triggered many political debates over 
the past decade. As stated before, we concentrate our analysis on the government’s stance. Turkey 
has been governed by Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his conservative and moderately Islamist (and in-
creasingly authoritarian) AKP (“Justice and Development Party”) since 2003. Erdogan and the governing 
AKP have pursued a rather welcoming discourse on refugees and have more or less consistently advo-
cated for an open border policy (with a slight course reversal in 2018/19). 
The problem diagnosis advanced by the government is the following. In its view, the dictatorship of 
Bashar al-Assad in Syria and the ensuing civil war have created a humanitarian disaster and caused 
millions of Syrian civilians to flee. Most are crossing the border to Turkey to seek refuge.  
Confronted with this situation, Erdogan and representatives of the AKP mobilize a very particular 
definition of the Turkish “we”. They define Turkey not in terms of the modern secular Turkish Republic 
(i.e., stressing national unity and secularism). Rather, they seek to reconnect to Turkey’s Ottoman im-
perial past and emphasize its Islamic heritage. This is expressed in the following quote from a speech 
given by President Erdogan on the Opening Day of the Turkish National Assembly in 2015, in which he 
addressed the refugee crisis: “What we call Syria and Iraq at present, were geographies no different to 
us than Mardin, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep and Hatay just a century ago” (Erdogan 2015). In this quote, 
Erdogan evokes the geographic extension of the former Ottoman Empire, which covered the territo-
ries of present-day Syria and Iraq, and he includes these territories in the definition of the “we”. 
This definition of Turkish identity entails a definition of the refugees from Syria not as “others”, but 
essentially as part of the “we”. Syrian refugees are sometimes referred to as “brothers and sisters” 
because of the common ancestry they share with Turkish citizens as part of the Ottoman Empire. They 
are also defined as religious fellows suffering from persecution (“muhacir”) to whom Muslim Turks are 
required to show hospitality. It must be noted, however, that the government never refers to Syrians 
as “refugees” under international law, with the corresponding rights, but rather as “guests”, which 
suggests that Turkey is acting out of a sense of hospitality and not under a legal obligation. 
In consequence, the government’s arguments for the admission of Syrian refugees are straightfor-
ward. It primarily appeals to Turkey’s obligation to help former subjects of the Ottoman Empire now 
suffering from war and persecution, just as Turkey took in refugees from former Ottoman lands after 
the collapse of the Empire. The government also appeals to a sense of solidarity with fellow Muslims. 
In this case, a typical historical analogy mobilized by the government is the story of the solidarity the 
citizens of Medina extended to prophet Mohammed and his followers fleeing persecution in Mecca. 
Taken together, Erdogan and the AKP appeal to a sense of hospitality and solidarity, and not to legal 
obligations towards Syrians. This is expressed in the following quote: “Drawing a line between our 
citizens and those living in Syria and Iraq would make us embarrassed in the eyes of history, our an-
cestors and especially our martyrs.” (Erdogan 2015). 
Accounting for the Turkish government’s discourse on refugees 
How can we account for the Turkish government’s rather welcoming discourse towards Syrian refu-
gees? We argue that this has to do with the following discursive opportunity structures: 
1) The Turkish government’s discourse on Syrian refugees is substantially entangled with its attempt to 
redefine Turkey’s collective identity and historical memory (see also Polat 2017). The AKP mobilizes a 
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very different understanding of Turkey’s collective identity than the official ideology of the modern 
Turkish Republic founded in 1923. This narrative had emphasized national unity and the secularist 
character of the Republic. It had also stressed Turkey’s “Western” orientation and constructed a sym-
bolic boundary towards neighboring Muslim Arab countries. In contrast, for a couple of years now, the 
AKP has attempted to revalue Turkey’s imperial past in terms of the Ottoman Empire as well as to 
emphasize religious traditions and an Islamic identity. This identity construction defines Turkey as 
sharing historical and religious bonds with neighboring Middle Eastern countries.  
2) Interestingly, economic and security-based factors are largely absent from the government’s dis-
course about Syrian refugees. Instead, this dimension is taken up by the opposition parties who point 
out the pressures on the national labor market following the admission of Syrian refugees, the burden 
they put on state finances, and the threat emanating from terrorist organizations (Kurdish and IS re-
lated) moving across the Syrian border.  
3) The discourse in Turkey relating to Syrian refugees is also heavily influenced by foreign policy con-
siderations, both in relation to the “Middle East” and the “West.” On the one hand, the government’s 
discourse on refugees is related to Turkey’s role in the Middle East. Under the recent “neo-Ottoman” 
foreign policy doctrine of the AKP government, Turkey is seeking to become a hegemonic regional 
power in the Middle East, in contrast to the “Western” orientation and non-interventionist foreign poli-
cy characterizing the previous Kemalist doctrine (Arkan, Kınacıoğlu 2016). Consequently, Turkey be-
came involved militarily in the Syrian civil war, opposing the regime of Bashar al-Assad, first by funding 
opposition forces, then with military incursions into Northern Syria. As such, Turkey has become the 
most important player in the conflict besides Russia and Iran. Accepting Syrian refugees can be inter-
preted as part of this geopolitical strategy, signaling Turkey’s rebuke of Assad and assuming the role of 
regional benefactor. This strategic orientation is opposed by opposition parties, who criticize Turkey’s 
involvement in the Syrian civil war. 
On the other hand, Turkey’s policy towards Syrian refugees is related to Turkey’s relationship to the EU 
and the “West” in general. In recent years, Turkey’s EU accession bid has come to a halt due to the 
reluctance of the EU, as well as Erdogan’s increasingly authoritarian policies and the geopolitical re-
orientation of his foreign policy. In March 2016, the Turkish government signed a “re-admissions” 
agreement with the EU, in which it agreed to take back refused asylum seekers in exchange for EU 
funding. In this context, Syrian refugees act as a “bargaining chip” for the Turkish government. First, 
the fact that Turkey is the largest host country of Syrian refugees, while the EU closes its borders, can 
be used to shame the EU’s professed “humanitarianism”. Second, hosting Syrian refugees secures EU 
and international funding. And finally, the threat to open Turkey’s borders to the EU, allowing Syrian 
refugees to continue to Europe, forms a potent bargaining tool in the relationship to the EU. 
The political discourse on Venezuelan migrants in Chile 
Background information on Chile’s migration policy 
In recent decades, Chile has turned from a country of net emigration into a country of net immigra-
tion. As of 2019, Chile hosted 1,492,522 international migrants, which is around 7% of the resident 
population (INE–DEM 2019). Most migrants come from Venezuela (455,494), followed by Peru 
(235,165) and Haiti (185,865).  
Chile hosts only a few hundred recognized refugees. However, the UNHCR recognizes migrants 
from Venezuela as a population of concern (though not directly as refugees). About 4.5 million Vene-
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zuelans have left the country mostly since 2015 due to political instability and the socioeconomic crisis 
under the Socialist government of Nicolás Maduro (UNHCR 2020). Chile is the third-largest host coun-
try of Venezuelan migrants in Latin America, after Colombia and Peru. The Chilean government does 
not categorize Venezuelans as refugees in terms of policy, but in 2018 it decided to extend special so-
called “visas of democratic responsibility” to them. 
At the time of the debates we analyzed, Chile’s migration law still dated back to 1975, drafted under 
the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet. It has been undergoing successive reform efforts since 
2008. Chile is a signatory of the relevant international agreements on refugees, such as the 1951 Refu-
gee Convention and its Protocol. It has also signed the (non-binding) Cartagena Declaration, which 
extends the refugee definition contained in the 1951 Convention.  
The Chilean government’s discourse on Venezuelan migrants 
The issue of Venezuelan migrants is embedded in the broader debate on the reform of Chile’s migra-
tion law which was triggered by the rising number of migrants. Since 2008, successive reform efforts 
have been undertaken by alternating left-wing and right-wing governments. Pressures to reform 
mounted with the Venezuela crisis and the rapidly rising number of Venezuelan migrants since 2015. 
We concentrate on statements on the migration law reform initiated by the right-wing government of 
Sebastián Piñera and his coalition “Chile Vamos” in 2018. The bill was approved in Parliament across 
party lines. Again, given space limits, we do not focus on inter-party differences. 
The Chilean government’s problem diagnosis is the following: Chile has become a country of immi-
gration, attracting migrants because of its political stability and economic growth compared to other 
countries in the region. In particular, it attracts migrants from Venezuela, who are escaping the politi-
cal instability and socioeconomic crisis under the Socialist regime of Nicolás Maduro. However, Chile’s 
migration law is not up to date to adequately deal with this influx. 
Confronted with this situation, the government proposes a definition of the Chilean “we” that de-
scribes Chile as a successful role model of “modernization” in the region, a development the govern-
ment takes pride in. Modernization is understood in the sense of the world cultural script: Economic 
growth, democracy and a stable rule of law, commitment to international law and multilateralism. Its 
success in these areas has put Chile ahead of other countries of the region (particularly failing Vene-
zuela). However (and this element is only marginal in the government’s discourse but more prominent 
among the opposition parties), Chile also has to grapple with a troubled past under the military dicta-
torship of Augusto Pinochet that persecuted political opponents and forced many of them into exile. 
The Chilean government’s description of the refugees and migrants coming to Chile refers to attrib-
utes of “universal personhood”: They are defined as individuals in search of better opportunities, sub-
ject to the rule of law and endowed with rights and obligations. The government speaks of “friends 
that have come to our country to realize their dreams of a better life” (Piñera 2018, authors’ transla-
tion) – understood primarily in economic, but also in political and social terms.3 This applies to Vene-
zuelans in particular, whose life plans are being thwarted by the Venezuelan government. In addition, 
the government emphasizes migrants’ human capital (skills and resources) and their potential eco-
nomic contribution to the country.  
Given these definitions of the “we” and the migrants, the Chilean government argues for the admis-
sions of migrants (and Venezuelans in particular) for the following reasons. First, they should be admit-
ted because they can contribute with their skills and resources to Chile’s project of modernization. And 
                                                          
3 But there is also a strong symbolic boundary against “criminal” migrants who do not play by the rules. 
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second, the government also appeals to an obligation of reciprocity. Given its history and the fact that 
many Chileans were forced into exile by the Pinochet dictatorship, Chile has an obligation of reciproci-
ty towards refugees and those from Venezuela in particular, as Venezuela took in Chilean refugees 
decades ago. This is illustrated in the president’s announcement of the “visa of democratic responsibil-
ity” extended to Venezuelans, which he justifies by “taking into consideration the serious democratic 
crisis that currently affects Venezuela, and recalling the humanitarian policy that Venezuela had that 
welcomed many Chileans in times when they needed it and who were seeking refuge on its borders” 
(Piñera 2018, authors’ translation). 
Accounting for the Chilean government’s discourse on refugees 
How can we account for the Chilean government’s discourse on Venezuelan migrants? 
1) Chile’s discourse on migration is shaped by the way political actors define its national identity and 
collective memory. In particular, Chile’s collective memory is shaped by the military dictatorship under 
Augusto Pinochet (from 1973 to 1990). His regime was responsible for murdering political opponents, 
massive human rights violations and forcing many members of the opposition into exile across the 
world. Chile’s “return to democracy” is marked by attempts to redress these wrongs and strengthen 
the country’s commitment to human rights. References to this troubled past are more prominent in 
the statements of the political opposition, but the government occasionally appeals to obligations 
deriving from this history as well. 
2) Chile’s discourse on migration is also shaped by how political actors perceive and define its national 
economic situation. Chile has had one of the highest economic growth rates of the region in the past 
decades and has recently turned into one of the few high-income countries in Latin America. In conse-
quence, Chile was admitted to the OECD in 2010. These factors contribute to viewing rising migration 
as a proof of the country’s success compared to other countries in the region.4 
3) Finally, Chile’s political discourse on migration is shaped by its foreign policy doctrine. On the one 
hand, Chile is a somewhat peripheral country at the margins of the world system. This sense of mar-
ginality might have been further supported by international isolation under Pinochet’s military dicta-
torship. To make up for its marginal position, Chile has strived to establish itself as a serious partner in 
international relations, committed to multilateralism and international law. Reforming the country’s 
migration law is seen as bringing it in line with international standards. On the other hand, particularly 
the right-wing government of Piñera maintains a critical distance to the new Socialist governments of 
Latin America (such as Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and at times Argentina). It warned that Chile could 
become like “Venezuela” under a left-wing government. Hence, the admission of migrants from Vene-
zuela is a device to “shame” the Maduro government and prove Chile’s anti-Socialist stance. 
Summary 
This paper has presented work in progress from a comparative analysis of political discourses on the 
admission or rejection of refugees in different countries around the world. Despite being subject to 
the norms and principles of international law that require states to open their borders to refugees 
                                                          
4 However, Chile is also one of the most unequal countries of the region. This led to social unrest at the end of 2019, 
which occurred after the debates we analyze here. It is an open question whether socioeconomic anxieties might con-
tribute to a more restrictive discourse on migration. 
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seeking safety from persecution and serious human rights violations, states differ significantly in 
terms of their refugee policies and their justifications of these policies. We have tried to account for 
these country-specific political discourses by drawing on the notion of “discursive opportunity struc-
tures”. We have illustrated how different discursive opportunity structures might have shaped the 
Turkish discourse on Syrian refugees and the Chilean discourse on Venezuelan migrants. 
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